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Abstract  
This paper examines the so-popular anecdote according to which pro-cyclical fiscal policies 
are due to pro-cyclical behavior of financing.  We address the question of whether or not 
pro-cyclical aid leads to pro-cyclical fiscal policies in SSA recipient countries. We employed 
panel data techniques covering 39 SSA countries over the period 1985- 2012. We found that 
results depend on the type of aid: pro-cyclical bilateral aid is negatively associated to pro-
cyclical fiscal policy, while pro-cyclical ODA from multilateral agencies leads to more pro-
cyclical fiscal policy. This finding is robust to potential error bias, alternative specifications, 
additional controls and different estimation methods. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The contribution of ODA to development divides researchers. On the one hand, aid skeptics 
(Friedman, 1958; Bauer, 1972; Easterly, 2001) argue that it perpetuates bad governments, 
enriches elites, and creates a disincentive for governments to boost domestic resource 
mobilization. On the other hand, proponents of aid (Sachs, 2004; Stern 2002; Stiglitz, 2002) 
are of the view that it complements domestic savings and supports growth and poverty 
reduction in recipient countries (UNECA, 2009, Radelet, 2006). While aid volatility, 
predictability and pro-cyclicality are widely investigated in the literature (Bulỉř and Hamann 
2001, 2003, 2005; Pallage and Robe 2001; Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2008; Fielding and 
Movratas, 2005; Gnangnon, 2014 and so on), few studies have been done about the aid effect 
on fiscal policy behavior. However, some authors have shown that aid is important for fiscal 
policy in recipient countries (Lensink and Morrissey (2000), Gemmell & McGillivray, 1998; 
Pallage and Robe (2003)). For instance, Celasun and Walliser (2008) argue that “more 
predictable aid would improve recipient countries” ability to plan for aid flows and allow 
them to more effectively execute the activities financed with such aid. Low predictability, by 
contrast, is costly by requiring adjustments to government consumption and investment plans 
with potential harmful effects on the objective attached to the spending of aid resources. Only 
Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne (2009), Thornton (2008); Mpatswe, Tapsoba and York 
(2012) have empirically studied on aid effect on fiscal policy behavior. While Thornton 
(2008); Mpatswe, Tapsoba and York (2012) found a positive and strongly significant 
relationship between net foreign aid and fiscal policy pro-cyclicality, Lledó, Yackovlev, and 
Gadenne (2009) shown that a larger share of aid in GDP seems to decrease pro-cyclicality, 
suggesting that access to concessional sources of finance enables countries in SSA to mitigate 
the tendency for spending growth to follow output growth (p. 24). However, these studies 
failed to look at about aid cyclicality effect on fiscal policy behavior. Previous literature has 
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measured aid cyclicality with respect to national income (e.g., Pallage and Robe 2001), fiscal 
receipts (e.g., Bulỉř and Hamann 2001, 2003, 2005) or exports of goods and services (Chauvet 
and Guillaumont, 2008). Given the fact that these assessments are not exogenous, we propose 
here to define aid cyclicality according to donor GDP growth or output gap. Indeed, many 
studies have shown that aid efforts depend on donor macroeconomic conditions (Bertoli, 
Cornia and Manaresi, 2008; Beenstock, 1980; Fuchs, Dreher and Nunnenkamp, 2014; 
Boschini and Olofsgard, 2007; Round and Odedokun, 2003, 2004), and this situation 
increases aid uncertainty. In the context of the current economic crisis, that is an important 
challenge for all SSA countries which are mainly aid-dependent countries.  This raises the 
question of whether the international community could better support SSA countries to 
achieve MDGs and beyond. We contribute to the literature by linking aid cyclicality to fiscal 
policy behavior and examining the determinants of pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in SSA. 
Our central hypothesis is that ODA pro-cyclicality can lead to fiscal policy pro-cyclicality in 
SSA countries because of their high reliance on aid as source of financing. In previous 
literature, it was been argued that pro-cyclical access to international capital markets by 
developing countries may lead to pro-cyclical fiscal policies and, hence, higher aggregate 
volatility (Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008; Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi, 1996; 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh, 2004). Here, we focus on aid pro-cyclicality that depends 
strongly on donor macroeconomic conditions. To the best of our knowledge, no study has 
already been done in such approach. Given the fact that African countries are aid-dependent, 
the behavior of fiscal policy may follow the behavior of ODA allocation. Then, the allocation 
of aid according to donor macroeconomic conditions is hardly controllable by recipient 
countries, which can therefore run macroeconomic mismanagement. According to Ouedraogo 
(2013), the uncertainty of aid inhibits budgetary comprehensiveness of recipient countries, 
because they cannot plan ahead for the size of external resources which they will have in the 
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fiscal year.  This compromises strongly the ability of recipient countries to plan ahead their 
expenses and therefore to run counter-cyclical fiscal policies. In this paper, we review 
previous literature and attempt to further investigate the determinants of the pro-cyclicality of 
fiscal policy in Africa. Relying on both general and country-specific and stylized facts on 
ODA and fiscal policy behavior, our contribution is five fold. First, we disentangle between 
bilateral and multilateral ODA contrary to previous studies that consider total aid, while 
motivations under each type of aid do not meet. Second, we study the behavior of fiscal 
policy and ODA in SSA in overall by estimating the non-parametric time-varying coefficients 
panel data models of Li et al (2011). Third, we generate the annual time-varying cyclicality 
coefficients for each SSA country, contrary to Aghion and Marinescu (2008) and Mpatswe, 
Tapsoba and York (2012) that estimated for OECD and CEMAC countries, respectively. 
Fourth, we take the advantage of using many indicators of fiscal policy (general government 
consumption, public investment and total expenditures) and also undertake an important 
number of robustness exercises. Fourth, we attempt to deal with the potential bias by using a 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) model, which instruments ODA cyclicality coefficients with 
development agency independence and political proximity. Fifth, we investigate the channels 
through which ODA pro-cyclicality can cause fiscal policy pro-cyclicality.  We employ panel 
data techniques covering 39 SSA countries over the period from 1985 to 2012. We find that 
results depend on the type of ODA: bilateral aid is negatively associated to pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy, while pro-cyclical ODA from multilateral agencies leads to more pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy. This finding is robust to potential error bias in ODA cyclicality coefficients, 
alternative specifications, additional controls and different estimation methods. Furthermore, 
the effects seem to differ between British legal system‘s countries where bilateral aid leads to 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy and other ones French where ODA from multilateral agencies 
appears more better for fiscal policy. However, both bilateral and multilateral ODA pro-
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cyclicality can lead to more pro-cyclical fiscal policy when the country is opened to 
international trade, oil or primary products exporter. We also found that the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries initiative and an improvement of the terms of trade stance lead to more pro-
cyclical fiscal policy.  
However, it is worth noting that we are not the first to study on pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy 
in SSA. Indeed, by estimating simple time series regressions for 37 low-income African 
countries during 1960–2004, Thornton (2008) suggests that government consumption is 
highly pro-cyclical, with consumption responding more than proportionately to fluctuations in 
output in many cases. Furthermore, he shows that government consumption is more pro-
cyclical in those African countries that are more reliant on foreign aid inflows and that are 
less corrupt, and that it is less pro-cyclical in countries with unequal income distribution and 
that are more democratic. He defines the cyclicality of fiscal policy in terms of the log of real 
government consumption and uses two stage estimations as empirical strategy. The first stage 
is to estimate cyclicality coefficients for government consumption in the individual African 
economies, while the second stage aims to explain the cross-country variation in the degree of 
pro-cyclicality of government consumption. 
Diallo (2008) focuses on the role of democratization to explain the difference in cross-country 
fiscal policy stance. By illustrating stylized facts in Botswana and Nigeria, he employs fiscal 
Taylor rule and system GMM to explore the implications of political changes on the cyclical 
properties of fiscal policy. He highlights that democratic institutions are associated to 
countercyclical fiscal policies and restraints on the executive branch are found to be the key 
factor that explains why democracies can better smooth business cycles than autocracies. His 
paper spans 47 SSA countries over the period of 1989-2002. Even if he defines fiscal policy 
with respect to government spending, his output variable is captured by movements in the 
terms of trade from their trend, which is assumed to be more exogenous than real GDP.   
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Contrary to Diallo (2009), Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne (2009) investigate the cyclical 
patterns of government expenditures in sub-Saharan Africa since 1970 and show that changes 
in political institutions have no impact on pro-cyclicality
1
. Furthermore, they found that pro-
cyclicality of fiscal policy is obvious in SSA countries, but it has declined in recent years. 
They use annual data in an unbalanced panel covering 39 years (1970–2008) and 174 
countries (including 44 SSA countries), and employ dynamic GMM techniques in which they 
control for endogeneity. Their fiscal policy definition is based on real central government 
spending and the key explanatory variable is growth in real GDP. 
With an aim of studying whether or not fiscal policy has contributed to the stabilization of 
output growth volatility in African countries, Carmignani (2010) concludes that pro-
cyclicality of fiscal policy in SSA countries is indisputable and that situation is a source of 
output volatility. His sample covers 37 African countries and the period of 1990-2007. 
Mpatswe, Tapsoba and York (2012) apply the system and difference GMM techniques on 
panel data of 44 SSA countries over the period of 1980-2008 and show that fiscal policies in 
SSA are strongly pro-cyclical. Their findings are consisting to government consumption, 
public investment and total public expenditures. Furthermore, they highlight that government 
consumption is less pro-cyclical than public investment, meaning that investment is extremely 
responsive to economic cycles. They further investigate fiscal policy behavior in CEMAC 
countries by calculating time-varying cyclical coefficients and also look at determinants of 
pro-cyclicality in this region
2
.  
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 begins by presenting the data, while part 
3 sketches how we measure ODA pro-cyclicality. Part 4 presents an overview on fiscal policy 
and ODA pro-cyclicality in Sub-Saharan Africa. The focus of part 5 is the presentation of the 
empirical model whose results are analyzed in part 6. Part 7 concludes and describes some 
economic policy recommendations. 
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2. Data and fiscal policy measure 
 
An annual panel dataset consisting of 39 SSA countries from 1985 to 2012 is constructed 
from a variety of sources. Variables of primary interest in the baseline model include the 
presence of real general government consumption growth, real GDP growth drawn from 
United Nations data website, and real ODA growth drawn from OECD-QWIDS datasets. In 
selecting all of these variables, we follow closely the work of previous study focusing mainly 
on fiscal policy. We deflate ODA data by using the deflators for resource flows from DAC 
donors, with 2012 as the base year. Concerning the measure of fiscal policy, we firstly prefer 
growth rates of government spending that correspond to policy instruments rather than fiscal 
outcomes such as primary balance, tax revenue and other fiscal variables that are endogenous. 
Moreover, in robustness checks, we will generate output gap by using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter with a smoothing parameter of 6.25 as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). The other 
control variables come from different sources. The real GDP per capita data with 2005 as the 
base year are drawn from World Development Indicators database-the World Bank. We also 
extracted the domestic private credit over GDP and inflation rate from this wide database. The 
public debt over GDP data are drawn from Abbas et al (2010)’s historical public debt 
database-the IMF, while financial openness indicator is from the Chinn-Ito dataset (Menzie 
and Ito, 2006). Moreover, we include political institution indicators that are drawn from Polity 
4 dataset (degree of democracy-Polity2; constraints on the executive-Xconst; government 
openness-Xopen) and Freedom House database where we prefer to use civil liberty indices. 
Finally, we extracted corruption data from the International Country Risk Guide, while 
checks and balance data are from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions. 
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3. How do we measure cyclicality of ODA? 
 
ODA cyclicality has already been studied in the literature. However, most of authors assessed 
ODA cyclicality with respect to national income (e.g., Pallage and Robe 2001) or fiscal 
receipts (e.g., Bulỉř and Hamann 2001, 2003, 2005) or exports of goods and services (Chauvet 
and Guillaumont, 2008). According to Chauvet and Guillaumont (2008), these studies 
conclude that aid is more often pro-cyclical than counter-cyclical; aid, at best, is not 
correlated with the cycles of national income or fiscal revenues (Bulỉř and Hamann 2001, 
2003, 2005; Pallage and Robe 2001). For instance, Bulỉř and Hamann (2001) found that aid is 
modestly pro-cyclical with correlation coefficients mainly concentrated on the right of zero 
and with only a small number of countries with counter-cyclical aid (P.3). However, as argued 
by Chauvet and Guillaumont (2008), these assessments are not exogenous.  But their proposal 
to assess aid cyclicality based on exports of goods and services is not satisfactory and is 
endogenous. For instance, many studies have found that aid for trade is positively associated 
with recipient exports (Calì and Te Velde, 2011; Helble et al., 2012; Pettersson and 
Johansson, 2013; Hühne et al., 2013). Moreover, Munemo et al. (2007: 430) even found that 
“a large amount of foreign aid adversely affects export performance of developing countries” 
by giving rise to Dutch disease. Thus, assessing aid cyclicality with respect to exports of 
goods and services is not exogenous. Although we do not aim to enter in this old debate, we 
propose here to measure aid cyclicality with respect to donor macroeconomic conditions. 
Indeed, many studies have shown that aid efforts depend on macroeconomic conditions in 
donor countries (Bertoli, Cornia and Manaresi, 2008; Beenstock, 1980; Fuchs, Dreher and 
Nunnenkamp, 2014; Boschini and Olofsgard, 2007; Round and Odedokun, 2003, 2004). 
Furthermore, many other studies found that ODA decreases (increases) when macroeconomic 
conditions deteriorate (improve) in donor countries and therefore put forward that aid is pro-
cyclical. We report in the following table, the meta-analysis of Fuchs, Dreher and 
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Nunnenkamp (2014) in this field. As we can see, no study has showed mixed negative or 
negative relationship between aid efforts and donors’ GDP growth or output gap.  
Table 1: Literature review on aid efforts and donor macroeconomic conditions  
Hypothesis Observed effect on aid budgets in different studies 
ODA decreases 
when 
macroeconomic 
conditions 
deteriorate in 
donor countries 
Positive  Mixed 
positive 
Insignificant Mixed 
negative 
Negative 
Round and 
Odedokun 
(2003, 2004) 
Brech and 
Potrafke (in 
press) 
Lundsgaarde et 
al. (2007) 
  
 Frot (2009)    
 Tingley 
(2010) 
   
 Bertoli et al. 
(2008) 
   
 Faini (2006)    
Source: Fuchs, Dreher and Nunnenkamp (2014), P. 175. Note that we merge results for GDP growth and output 
gap. 
 
In this paper, for each recipient country, we retain the top ten donors defined as the sum of aid 
provided since 1985. Such method aims to focus on main donors, those whose aid could affect 
fiscal policy in the recipient country. For instance, the top ten historical donors of Burkina 
Faso since 1985 are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Their grants represent 92.12 % over the total of 
bilateral aid to Burkina Faso. As an old French colony, France is the leading donor ($2.263 
billion), followed by the Netherlands ($1.108 billion). However, the economic crisis forced 
the Netherlands’s development agency to leave from Burkina Faso and further reduce their 
aid to this country
3
.  Such situation can affect fiscal policy in the recipient country. In order to 
study how aid recipient countries’ fiscal policy behaves according to donor macroeconomic 
conditions, we generate the averaged real GDP growth by the following formula:   
𝑌_𝑑𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑑_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑦𝑗,𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
𝑌_𝑑𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡, is defined as real GDP growth to the average donor weighted by the amount of 
aid a country receives from that particular donor. Where 𝑎𝑖𝑑_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the aid share of 
(1) 
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donor 𝑗 in recipient country i’s total bilateral aid from members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) in period 𝑡; 𝑦𝑗,𝑡 is real GDP growth of the donor country. In 
section 6, for robustness check, we will replace donor’s real GDP growth by its output gap. 
As for multilateral aid, 𝑦𝑗,𝑡 represents the mean of OECD countries’ GDP growth.  
4. Pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy and ODA in Sub-Saharan Africa: an 
overview 
 
In this section, we empirically look at the behavior of fiscal policy and Official Development 
Aid (ODA) in Africa by estimating the non-parametric time-varying coefficients panel data 
models developed by Li et al (2011). We would like estimate the time-varying coefficients for 
overall Sub-Saharan Africa countries. The non-parametric models allow us estimating a non-
linear panel data model irrespective of the density of the coefficient function. In recent years, 
a lot of econometric literature has been devoted to estimating time varying coefficients in 
regression models. Since their introduction by Cooley and Prescott (1973, 1976) and 
Rosenberg (1972), time varying parameter regression models have been used extensively in 
empirical studies. These models permit the regression coefficients to evolve over time, so they 
can be applied to time series models with parameter instability. Following Li et al (2011), we 
use a non-parametric trending time-varying coefficients panel data model of the form:  
                                    𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑡,𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝑗
𝑑
𝑗=1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                      (2) 
= 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑇 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡,      𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁,      𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, 
Where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = (𝑋𝑖𝑡,1, … , 𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝑑)
𝑇 , 𝛽𝑡 = (𝛽𝑡,1, … , 𝛽𝑡,𝑑)
𝑇 , all  𝛽𝑡 et 𝑓𝑡 are unknown functions, {𝛼𝑖} 
reflects unobserved individual effect, and {𝑒𝑖𝑡} is stationary and weakly dependent for each 𝑖 
and independent of  {𝑋𝑖𝑡} et {𝛼𝑖}, 𝑇 is the time series length and 𝑁 is the cross section size. 
One assume that : ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 0. In our case, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents general government consumption 
growth or ODA growth and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is recipients’ GDP growth or donors’ GDP growth.  
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In their paper, Li et al (2011) develop two methods to estimate the trend function and the 
coefficient function without taking the first difference to eliminate the fixed effects. The first 
one eliminates the fixed effects by taking the cross-sectional averages and the uses a non-
parametric local linear method to estimate both the trend and coefficient functions. The 
second proposes a pooled local linear dummy variable approach. It removes the fixed effects 
by deducting a smoothed version of cross-time average from each individual. The simulation 
and analysis of UK’s climate real data applied in their paper show that the local linear dummy 
variable estimate of 𝛽(. ) outperforms the averaged local linear estimate. This finding is also 
consistent with Gersovitz and Mackinnon (1978) and Hylleberg (1986) that showed that 
dummy specification provides a good model. Given that we are interested in time-varying 
coefficients 𝛽𝑡, we then estimate the local linear dummy variable.  
We now use this method to estimate two equations. The first one characterizes the 
relationship between general government consumption growth and recipients’ GDP growth. 
This describes the behavior of fiscal policy in Sub-Saharan Africa countries since 1985. The 
second ties ODA growth to donors’ GDP growth and illustrates the evolution of aid to sub-
Saharan Africa pro-cyclicality. The results of these estimations are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Cyclicality of fiscal policy and ODA in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1985 and 2012. Note that left axis 
represents fiscal policy cyclicality coefficient and the right one is ODA cyclicality coefficient.  
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We can observe that even if fiscal policy and ODA are globally pro-cyclical, their paths are 
not the same. Indeed, pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy increased during the period 1985-2000 
and decreased since the last decade. Contrary fiscal policy stance, pro-cyclicality of bilateral 
and multilateral ODA evolved in the same path. It has been subsequently decelerating until 
2006 before climbing by a modest rebound. Furthermore, we observe that bilateral ODA was 
slightly countercyclical between 2002 and 2008.  
Econometric evidence on the relative magnitude and evolution of pro-cyclical patterns in 
fiscal policy for overall SSA countries in particular is sparse (Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne 
2009). Some econometricians rely on sub-period analysis to provide evidence on the 
evolution of fiscal policy cyclicality. For instance Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin (2012) divided 
the period of 1960-2009 into two sub-samples: 1960-1999 and 2000-2009 in order to analyze 
fiscal policy behavior since 1960s. Using sample of 94 countries (21 developed and 73 
developing countries, including 25 SSA), they show that many countries have continued to 
behave pro-cyclically over the last decade. Furthermore, using GMM techniques for 44 SSA 
countries for the sub-samples 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-08, Lledó, Yackovlev, 
and Gadenne (2009) show that fiscal policy was a-cyclical for the 1970s, but in the 1980s and 
1990s it was pro-cyclical and increasing. Moreover, during the period of 2000-08, the 
coefficient of pro-cyclicality falls to the point that it is lower than that for other developing 
countries. This suggests that fiscal policy in the region has in recent years become less pro-
cyclical. That finding is so consistent with what reported in figure 1. This can be explained by 
the adoption of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) in most of SSA countries since 
1999. Updated every three years with annual progress reports, PRSPs describe the country's 
macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs over a three year or longer 
horizon to promote broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated financing 
needs and major sources of financing. Thus, by planning policies and sources of financing, 
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these programs allow to reduce fluctuations of government expenditures and therefore the 
pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy.  
Moving on aid pro-cyclicality, figure 1 highlights that while ODA from multilateral agencies 
was pro-cyclical over the whole period, bilateral aid was pro-cyclical during the sub-periods 
1985-2001 and 2009-2012. During these years, ODA to SSA countries tends to be disbursed 
mostly in periods when averaged donors’ output is high and held back when donors’ domestic 
economic activity is contracting. This reflects fiscal constraints in developed countries when 
economic activities are slowdown. In contrast, bilateral ODA was countercyclical between 
2002 and 2008, meaning that donors’ countries have increased aid even if they experience 
worse economic performances. However, this finding can be related to aid relief whose many 
developed countries reported as effective disbursement of aid. Indeed, at the G-8 meeting
4
 
held in Cologne (Germany) in 1999, the members proposed to cancel 100% bilateral debts for 
various African countries. This initiative is followed by the declaration of the 2005 G-8 
Summit in Gleneagles (United Kingdom) which aims to scale down $ 40 billion of 
multilateral debts for 18 indebted poor countries, including 14 SSA countries. All of these 
debt cancellations are reported as ODA by donor countries and therefore aid was less 
dependent on donors’ economic performance.   
5. Empirical analysis: the identification strategy 
 
After discussing overall SSA countries policies, we develop here country-specific conditions 
and formalize the equations that will be estimated.  
As argued in section 1, we are also interesting in fiscal policy behavior for each country and 
therefore we would like estimating time-varying cyclicality coefficients by country. Remind 
that we aim to estimate the impact of aid cyclicality on fiscal policy cyclicality. To this end, 
we have to estimate time-varying cyclicality coefficients for aid and time-varying cyclicality 
 Etudes et Documents n° 24, CERDI, 2014 
 
16 
   
coefficients for fiscal policy by individual African economies. Then, we will estimate the link 
between the two estimated coefficients using fixed-effects panel data.  
Following previous literature
5
, the empirical strategy is in two stages. In the first step, we 
consider the estimation of the following equation for fiscal policy behavior:  
 ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡∆𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡                            (3) 
Where ∆ indicates the annual change in the variable,   i= 1, 2, ..., N is the country index; t=1, 
2, ...,T is the time index;  Log(F) represents the log of real fiscal variable (general government 
consumption, public investment or government total expenditures); Log(Y) stands for real 
GDP, and 𝜑 represent error terms.  
In line with Aghion and Marinescu (2008) and Mpatswe, Tapsoba and York (2012), the 
coefficient βit is then allowed to be country specific and time varying. By applying the first 
difference transform to the data, we are in effect using deviations from fixed long-run trends 
of our variables, ruling out any structural relationship between F and Y which is linear and 
time invariant. The cyclical characterization of fiscal policy depends on the sign and statistical 
significance of the coefficient βit: if it is positive, the fiscal policy is pro-cyclical ; if it is 
negative, then fiscal policy is counter-cyclical ; and if the coefficient is insignificant, then 
fiscal policy can be classified as a-cyclical. 
As for ODA behavior, we estimate the following equation:  
∆𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡∆𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑌_𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝑡                      (4) 
Where 𝜏 represent error terms, ODA is real Official Development Aid received by country 𝑖, 
Y_Donor is the averaged real GDP growth of the main donor countries calculated in part 3. 
That is to say, for each recipient country, we retain the top ten donors defined as the sum of 
aid provided since 1985. As argued above, the cyclical behavior of ODA depends on the sign 
and statistical significance of the coefficient ϑit: if it is positive, the ODA is pro-cyclical ; if it 
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is negative, then ODA is counter-cyclical ; and if the coefficient is insignificant, then aid can 
be classified as a-cyclical.  
Subsequently, we present the econometric technique to estimate the coefficients βit and ϑit. 
To this end, we follow Aghion and Marinescu (2008) and Mpatswe, Tapsoba and York (2012) 
by using local Gaussian-weighted OLS to estimate equations (3) and (4). This technique 
determines the time-varying cyclicality coefficient for country 𝑖 at year 𝑡 by using all 
observations and assigning greater weights to those observations closest to the reference year 
(Mpatswe, Tapsoba and York, 2012). The least squares estimation procedure considers all 
points in a local neighborhood but allow for discrimination among the observations. The 
motivation behind this technique is to gain more accuracy at the reference year than the 10-
rolling-window ordinary least squares, which is also estimated in Aghion and Marinescu 
(2008).   
The second stage of the process is to examine if aid cyclicality explains fiscal policy 
cyclicality. Then, we use the time-varying cyclicality coefficients obtained from equations 
(3), (4), and we implement panel data techniques to perform our analysis. These techniques 
allow us to control for the presence of country-specific effects in order to avoid biased 
estimates. We follow therefore Aghion and Marinescu (2008) and Mpatswe, Tapsoba and 
York (2012). Specifically, we estimate the following equation:  
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃 + 𝜋?̂?𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡                                     (5) 
Where 𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑡 denotes the control variables and 𝜔𝑖𝑡 stands for the error term including a 
country-specific fixed effect and an idiosyncratic fiscal shock. We also include period 
dummies, 𝛿𝑡, to account for common time effects such as shocks affecting all SSA countries 
at the same time, as is standard in the literature. Given that each SSA country in the sample 
has its own economic, political and institutional characteristics that are likely to be correlated 
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with the explanatory variables of the model, panel fixed-effects models are more appropriate 
to this study.  
We now turn to explanatory variables included in the equation (5). Following previous 
literature on main determinants of pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in SSA, we consider those 
related to the country’s economic development, financing constraints (domestic and 
international markets), the variables that proxy for macroeconomic policy sustainability and 
stabilization concerns and finally variables of governance and institutions.  
For economic development variable, we consider the real GDP per capita drawn from World 
Development Indicators, the World Bank. Indeed, it is widely shared among researched that 
developed countries conduct sound policy than under-developed countries (Halland and 
Bleaney, 2011, Mpatswe, Tapsoba and York (2012); Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin, 2012; 
Ilzetski et al, 2008; Aghion and Marinescu, 2008 and so on). We therefore expect negative 
sign. As for financing constraints, we retain Credit-to-private sector over GDP as domestic 
financing constraint and Chinn-Ito financial openness index (Menzie and Ito, 2006) to 
measure international markets integration (KAOPEN). Credit-to-private sector is used as a 
proxy for the depth of the domestic credit market that, if it is not limited, can allow to pursue 
expansionary fiscal policies during downturns. However, its effect on fiscal policy is mixed 
according to previous literature. As for financial openness index, it is based on the binary 
dummy variables for the four major categories of restrictions on external accounts; presence 
of multiple exchange rates; restrictions on current account transactions; restrictions on capital 
account transactions and the requirement of the surrender of exports proceeds. A country 
financially opened can easily borrow in bad times than those closed countries. This variable 
has been already used in previous studies (Endegnanew, 2013; Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin, 
2012). We expect therefore negative sign.  
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In line with Halland and Bleaney (2011), Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne (2009), Mpatswe, 
Tapsoba and York (2012), Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin (2012) and so on, we include Debt-to-
GDP ratio to control for macroeconomic policy sustainability. Reinhart, Rogoff and 
Savastano (2003) argued that debt could be conductive to more pro-cyclicality simply because 
they signal tighter financial conditions. Then, concerned countries can be shut out of 
international financial markets because of recent history of default or high debt, therefore no 
external credit is available to help smooth fiscal policy over the cycle. Furthermore, we 
include inflation rate to control for stabilization concerns. According to Lledó, Yackovlev, 
and Gadenne (2009) high inflation can affect a government’s ability to adjust to the economic 
cycle, because fiscal policy is subordinated to the aims of keeping price increases in check 
and reassuring creditors—avoiding hyperinflation. Such analysis is in line with Woo (2003), 
Ben Slimane and Ben Tahar (2010); Aghion and Marinescu (2008). Even if Lledó, 
Yackovlev, and Gadenne (2009) and Mpatswe, Tapsoba and York (2012) found no evidence 
of inflation effect on pro-cyclicality in SSA, we expect positive sign.  
Finally, in line with the most studies and the commonly discussed determinant of pro-
cyclicality highlighted in the literature, we control for governance and political institutions. 
Indeed, several studies suggest that better political institutions, such as less corruption, more 
constraints on the executive or additional checks and balances, should lead to less pro-cyclical 
fiscal policies ((Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin, 2012; Alesina and Tabellini, 2005;  Calderón et 
al., 2004; Diallo, 2009; Thornton, 2008 and so on). However, some authors found that better 
democracy conduct to more procyclicality. For instance Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Friedman 
et al. (2000) and Ghura (2002) provide evidence that corruption leads to lower levels of tax 
collection and hence to sub-optimal government spending. Thus, better governance (lower 
corruption) may do nothing to make fiscal policy less countercyclical: it may simply increase 
resources (tax revenue) available to support additional procyclical government spending. 
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Then, it is worth noting the effect depends on which indicator is used. To deal with this 
situation, we control for various indicators of political governance and institutions: degree of 
democracy “Polity2”, constraints on the executive “Xconst”, government openness 
“Xropen”, civil liberties “Civil_liberties”, Corruption “Corruption”, checks and balances 
“checks”.   
6. Results 
 
6-1. Descriptive statistics and figures 
 
We first present the descriptive statistics and some figures of the cyclicality coefficients 
generated in equations (3) and (4). Table 2 summarizes key results and we can observe that 
many SSA countries have carried out pro-cyclical fiscal policy (873 times out of 1092; i.e 
𝛽>0). Furthermore, among them, government consumption spending responds more than 
proportionately to output fluctuations in around half of the cases (i.e., 𝛽>1 in 371 times out of 
873). In contrast, SSA countries have conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy or at least 
satisfactory in only 20% of cases (𝛽<0).  
Table 2: Descriptive statics of time-varying cyclicality coefficients 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝛽 1092 0.698 1.387 -7.612 5.461 
𝛽>0 873 (80%) 1.12 0.962 0 5.462 
𝛽>1 371 1.929 0.966 1 5.462 
𝛽<0 219 (20%) -0.982 1.541 -7.612 -0.0008 
𝜗𝑏  1092 0.137 3.535 -18.134 17.694 
𝜗𝑏  >0 661 (60.53%) 1.981 2.188 0.0017 17.694 
𝜗𝑏 >1 414 2.856 2.356 1.001 17.694 
𝜗𝑏  <0 431 (39.47%) -2.69 3.335 -18.134 -0.01 
𝜗𝑚  1039 2.488 11.842 -31.875 55.282 
𝜗𝑚 > 0 547 (52.64%) 9.793 11.41 0 55.282 
𝜗𝑚 > 1 493 10.816 11.568 1.069 55.282 
𝜗𝑏 < 0 492 (47.36%) -5.634 5.116 -31.875 -0.005 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 𝜗𝑏 refers to bilateral aid and 𝜗𝑚 to multilateral aid. 
As for bilateral ODA cyclicality, table 2 shows this type of aid was pro-cyclical in 60.53% of 
cases (i.e 𝜗𝑏>0) and counter-cyclical in 39.47% of cases (i.e 𝜗𝑏 <0). However, we observe 
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that the magnitude of the ODA cyclicality coefficient is sometimes very high, it scales from -
18 to more than 17. Given that some SSA countries are dependent on aid, they can encounter 
problems if there are times when aid scale down until 17%. This volatility was most 
pronounced in countries receiving ODA from multilateral agencies. Indeed, the standard 
deviation is high (3.33 for the whole sample) and much worse in countries where multilateral 
aid is pro-cyclical (11.41).  
Now, we plot the time-varying cyclicality coefficients by country. Figure 2 (see below) shows 
the evolution of the cyclicality of the government consumption expenditures and ODA for 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda. See in appendix for the 
rest of countries. Figure 2 highlights that each country have experienced different evolution 
patterns of the cyclicality coefficients of government consumption spending and ODA.  
While pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy has dropped over the years for Botswana, Cameroon, 
Rwanda and Uganda, it has increased for Burkina Faso and Nigeria. This finding is consistent 
with what Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin (2012) found by dividing their sample (1960-2009) into 
two sub-samples (1960-1999 and 2000-2009). As for ODA cyclicality, we can see that 
although the cyclicality coefficient has slowly dropped for Nigeria, it has known very high 
fluctuations for Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Rwanda and Uganda. The case of 
Botswana, one of indisputable growing country in Africa, is important. Indeed, aid received 
by this country was counter-cyclical between 1992 and 2004 but it is becoming increasingly 
pro-cyclical contrary to other countries where aid pro-cyclicality is stable or decreasing in 
recent years.   
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Figure 2: Time-varying fiscal policy and bilateral ODA cyclicality between 1985 and 2012. In appendix, we 
report figures for multilateral aid. Note that left axis of each country’s figure is fiscal policy cyclicality 
coefficient and the right one is ODA cyclicality coefficient. In appendix, we present figures of the other SSA 
countries.  
 
6-2. Baseline estimate results 
 
We turn now to estimate results obtained from equation (5)’s regression. Note that we focus 
firstly on general government consumption expenditures.  
Table 3 and 4 report the results of the estimations of equation (5) specified for the case of 
general government consumption expenditures. From the outset, we observe that the effect of 
ODA pro-cyclicality on fiscal policy behavior depends on the type of aid. Indeed the 
associated coefficient to aid cyclicality is negative and significant (see table 3) for bilateral 
aid and positive and significant for multilateral aid (see table 4).  
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Table 3: Baseline results for bilateral aid 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Aidpro, t-1 -
0.030*** 
-
0.033*** 
-
0.035*** 
-
0.053*** 
-
0.046*** 
-
0.045*** 
-0.029** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) 
Log(gdppc) -0.125 -0.177 -0.322 -0.166 -0.18 -
0.926*** 
-0.097 
 (0.353) (0.387) (0.138) (0.428) (0.382) (0.005) (0.490) 
debt 0.152** 0.167** 0.167** 0.199*** 0.215*** 0.404*** 0.165** 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.028) (0.007) (0.003) (0.000) (0.022) 
private_credit -
0.013*** 
-0.010** -0.012** -
0.013*** 
-
0.016*** 
0.014*   -
0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.045) (0.019) (0.008) (0.002) (0.058) (0.008) 
kaopen 0.052 0.075* 0.064 0.039 0.054 0.112**  0.056 
 (0.188) (0.062) (0.125) (0.321) (0.176) (0.018) (0.164) 
Inflation 0.412*** 0.373*** 0.395*** 0.505*** 0.511*** 0.441*** 0.399*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
polity2  0.033***                     
  (0.000)                     
Civil_liberties   0.094**                    
   (0.015)                    
xconst    0.092***                   
    (0.000)                   
xropen     0.134***                  
     (0.000)                  
corruption      -
0.193*** 
 
      (0.001)  
Checks       0.079** 
       (0.029) 
_cons -0.318 0.206 1.436 -0.669 -0.741 3.870*   -0.626 
 (0.760) (0.88) (0.342) (0.632) (0.591) (0.078) (0.570) 
Years dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 894 842 820 794 794 610 845 
Countries 39 37  37 37 37 28 37 
R² 0.22 0.245 0.215 0.306 0.324 0.296 0.228 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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Table 4: Baseline results for multilateral aid 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Aidprom, t-1 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(gdppc) -0.19 -0.062 -0.178 0.058 -0.012 -0.785** -0.184 
 (0.17) (0.771) (0.433) (0.979) (0.957) (0.026) (0.207) 
debt 0.210*** 0.218*** 0.205*** 0.240*** 0.261*** 0.409*** 0.213*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
private_credit -0.021*** -
0.022*** 
-
0.022*** 
-0.023*** -
0.026*** 
0.095 -
0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.916) (0.000) 
kaopen 0.051 0.071* 0.045 0.043 0.060 0.074 0.056 
 (0.208) (0.085) (0.293) (0.294) (0.139) (0.124) (0.176) 
inflation 0.348*** 0.301*** 0.328*** 0.451*** 0.445*** 0.356*** 0.333*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
polity2  0.029***                     
  (0.001)                     
Civil_liberties   -0.024                    
   (0.556)                    
xconst    0.084***                   
    (0.001)                   
        
xropen     0.149***                  
     (0.000)                  
corruption      -
0.247*** 
                
      (0.000)                 
checks       0.084**  
       (0.021) 
_cons -0.144 -0.69 -0.0173 -2.004 -2.086 3.035 -0.264 
 (0.894) (0.628) (0.991) (0.176) (0.151) (0.2) (0.817) 
Year_dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 850 799 777 755 755 578 802 
Countries 39 37 37 37 37 28 37 
R² 0.248 0.276 0.238 0.32 0.346 0.324 0.256 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
 
In all columns of table 3, we reject at the 1 % level that the coefficients associated to “aidpro” 
is different from zero, except in column (7) where the coefficient is significant at 5% level. 
Then, pro-cyclical bilateral aid does not cause fiscal policy pro-cyclicality in SSA countries. 
This is unexpected finding because we was believed that lack of policy space due to 
 Etudes et Documents n° 24, CERDI, 2014 
 
25 
   
conditions attached to lending by donors (pro-cyclicality) limits the set of policy choices 
available to countries in response of shocks. Even if previous studies have not worked on the 
effect of aid cyclicality on fiscal policy, some authors have already shown that a larger share 
of aid seems to decrease fiscal policy pro-cyclicality, suggesting that access to concessional 
sources of finance enables countries in SSA to mitigate the tendency for spending growth to 
follow output growth (Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne, 2009).  
However, our hypothesis is confirmed by the case of multilateral ODA. Indeed, the 
coefficient associated to multilateral aid pro-cyclicality “aidprom” is positive and significant 
at 1% level in all columns of table 4. Pro-cyclical multilateral aid constrains the ability of 
low-income countries to run counter-cyclical fiscal policies. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis according to which pro-cyclical access to international capital markets by 
developing countries may lead to pro-cyclical fiscal policies (Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 
2008; Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi, 1996; Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh, 2004). 
These results mean that African countries run prudent macroeconomic policies when it comes 
to their partnership with OECD countries, but they remain more dependent on multilateral 
agency decisions. This is due to the policy of multilateral agencies like the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that traditionally influence the reforms in developing 
countries. Then, if there are downwards in developed countries and therefore difficult 
financial conditions, the multilateral agencies may reduce their assistance to developing 
countries and ask for them structural reforms which are sometimes tied to budget austerity 
policies. We will come back with further investigations in the following sections. 
Turning to control variables, the results indicate that GDP per capita does not appear to be a 
relevant determinant of fiscal policy pro-cyclicality in SSA countries. It is significant only in 
column (6) and shows that higher the GDP per capita, lower the pro-cyclicality of government 
consumption spending, which is a known result widely agreed among researchers (Lledó, 
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Yackovlev, and Gadenne, 2009; Alesina and Tabellini (2005); Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin 
(2012) and so on). While Halland and Bleaney (2011) found no evidence of the effect of the 
economic development level on fiscal policy in developing countries, Mpatswe, Tapsoba and 
York (2012) found that wealthier CEMAC countries behave more pro-cyclicality.  
As for financing constraint explanations of pro-cyclicality, we observe that credit-to-private 
sector is consistently significant and negatively associated to government consumption 
expenditures pro-cyclicality. In other words, financial development by allowing to borrow in 
any times in order to face fluctuations improves the ability of a country to carry out counter-
cyclical fiscal policy. This finding is consistent with Aghion and Marinescu (2008), Frankel, 
Vegh and Vuletin (2012), Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008). However, table 3 sheds light 
that SSA financially opened countries conduct more pro-cyclical fiscal policy. This finding 
contradicts the arguments put forward about lack of access or imperfect access to international 
credit markets to explain pro-cyclicality in developing countries (Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy, 2004; Riascos and Végh, 2004;  Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Aizenman et al 
(2003) and so on). We can explain this result by the fact that in good times financially opened 
can borrow in international markets to finance policies but in bad times borrowers are fear 
about the ability of the country to pay back. Such situations have been observed recently in 
Greece where the exchange was forced to close for this country during bad times in 2010 and 
opened in 2014 (precisely 10
th
 April) when Greece’s economic performance is recovering.  
Therefore, be financially integrated can conduct to more pro-cyclicality. Nevertheless, 
Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin (2012) found that financial integration can allow to carry out less 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy.  
Regarding the macroeconomic policy sustainability and stabilization concern explanations, 
table 3 highlights that both public debt and inflation lead to a loss of credibility and are 
associated to more fiscal policy pro-cyclicality. This finding is consistent with Reinhart, 
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Rogoff and Savastano (2003), Woo (2003), Ben Slimane and Ben Tahar (2010); Aghion and 
Marinescu (2008). Indeed, difficult macroeconomic conditions (high debt and high inflation) 
reduce the government’s ability to adjust to the economic cycle and therefore exacerbate the 
fluctuations.  
We now look at political governance and institutions concerns. Results reported in table 3 
shows that in SSA countries better governance is not associated to counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy. All indicators included are strongly significant and affect positively government 
consumption spending pro-cyclicality. This finding is in line with Woo ( 2008), Erbil (2011), 
Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008),  Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Friedman et al. (2000), 
Ghura (2002) that shown that better governance may do nothing to make fiscal policy less 
countercyclical: it may simply increase resources (tax revenue) available to support additional 
pro-cyclical government spending. However, it contradicts those of Frankel, Vegh and 
Vuletin, 2012; Alesina and Tabellini, 2005;  Calderón et al., 2004; Diallo, 2009; Thornton, 
2008 and so on that found that stronger institutions (more democracy, less corruption, more 
control on executives, more checks and balances) are linked to less pro-cyclical fiscal policy.  
6-3. Robustness checks 
 
To check the validity of our findings we undertake a number of robustness exercises. It is 
worth noting that we present in the following section the results for bilateral aid, while those 
of multilateral aid are reported in appendix.  
(i) Bootstrap 
Our first experiment essentially concerns the above results. Given that our ODA cyclicality 
coefficients are estimated variables, they are likely to be measured with error and therefore be 
biased. To deal with this issue, we follow Diallo (2009) by proposing the residual-based 
bootstrap method. The idea is to consider the observed sample the population and, at each 
iteration, draw from this a sub-sample that is used to estimate cyclicality coefficients (fiscal 
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policy and ODA). We generated 200 bootstrap samples from the given data above. Results 
reported in table 5 sheds light that bootstrapping estimates are quite similar to previous 
findings.  
Table 5:  Bootstrap results for bilateral aid 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Aidpro, t-1 -0.026** -
0.028*** 
-
0.031*** 
-
0.046*** 
-
0.039*** 
-
0.049*** 
-
0.025*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.008) 
Log(gdppc) -0.123 -0.203 -0.368* -0.142 -0.152 -
0.951*** 
-0.088 
 (0.239) (0.342) (0.074) (0.441) (0.357) (0.001) (0.412) 
debt 0.153** 0.179** 0.175* 0.213*** 0.230*** 0.403*** 0.166** 
 (0.025) (0.038) (0.07) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.021) 
private_credi
t 
-0.013*** -0.096** -0.011** -
0.013*** 
-
0.016*** 
0.014*   -
0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.022) (0.017) (0.003) (0.001) (0.068) (0.002) 
kaopen 0.039 0.072 0.058 0.039 0.054 0.109**  0.047 
 (0.319) (0.111) (0.195) (0.34) (0.139) (0.012) (0.219) 
Inflation 0.400*** 0.362*** 0.388*** 0.490*** 0.500*** 0.437*** 0.388*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
polity2  0.036***                     
  (0.000)                     
Civil_libertie
s 
  0.109***                    
   (0.003)                    
xconst    0.099***                   
    (0.000)                   
xropen     0.142***                  
     (0.000)                  
corruption      -
0.185*** 
 
      (0.000)  
Checks       0.089** 
       (0.031) 
_cons 0.274 0.396 1.817 -0.881 -1.012 4.179**  -0.653 
 (0.783) (0.806) (0.271) (0.503) (0.398) (0.042) (0.543) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 923 870 848 821 821 628 873 
Countries 39 37 37 37 37 28 37 
R² 0.224 0.251 0.224 0.314 0.334 0.31 0.233 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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More importantly, the coefficients remain strongly significant like those reported in table 3. 
This said pro-cyclicality of bilateral aid, domestic financial depth and high GDP per capita 
decease pro-cyclicality of government consumption spending. However, better governance 
and institutions, a loss of stabilization tool and macroeconomic policy unsustainability 
conduct to more fiscal policy pro-cyclicality in SSA countries.  
Results for multilateral aid (see table A 5 in appendix) are consistent with those of table 4, 
and show that pro-cyclical multilateral aid leads to pro-cyclical fiscal policy in SSA countries. 
Furthermore, the coefficients associated to “aidprom” are stable and closely equal to those of 
table 4.   
(ii) Testing for alternative measure of business cycle 
Up to now, we used real annual GDP growth both in SSA and donor countries to measure 
cyclicality of government consumption spending and ODA, respectively. However, in 
previous literature some authors have used output gap instead of GDP growth (Aghion and 
Marinescu, 2008; Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin, 2012; Carmigrani, 2010; Halland and Bleaney, 
2011, Woo, 2008; Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2004; Talvi and Vegh, 2005). The output 
gap is estimated as the log deviation from a Hodrick-Prescott trend. The smoothness 
parameter of the filter is set to 6.25 as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annual data. 
The results are presented in table 6. On the whole, they tend to support those reported in table 
3 about the effect of bilateral ODA pro-cyclicality on government consumption spending 
behavior.  Furthermore, a part from column (6), the magnitude of coefficient associated to 
ODA cyclicality is stable. For the rest of control variables, they are weakly significant, expect 
political governance and institutions indicators.  
As for multilateral aid whose results are reported in table A5 (in appendix), we observe that 
the associated coefficients to “aidprom” are positive and very high than those of table 4.  
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Table 6: Testing for alternative measure of business cycle 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Aidpro_gap, t-
1 
-0.027*** -
0.024*** 
-0.027*** -
0.022*** 
-
0.021*** 
-
0.041*** 
-0.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Log(gdppc) 0.112 0.093 0.006 0.089 0.066 0.194 0.141*   
 (0.135) (0.401) (0.96) (0.437) (0.564) (0.279) (0.074) 
debt 0.029 0.058 0.029 0.060 0.068* 0.077 0.041 
 (0.431) (0.144) (0.493) (0.135) (0.088) (0.179) (0.301) 
private_credit 0.080 0.014 0.019 -0.057 -0.023 0.095** 0.017 
 (0.742) (0.6) (0.496) (0.983) (0.412) (0.019) (0.946) 
kaopen 0.022 0.031 0.052 0.029 0.032 0.022 0.091 
 (0.992) (0.162) (0.82) (0.184) (0.145) (0.932) (0.687) 
inflation 0.045** 0.018 0.047** 0.081 0.033 0.023 0.038*   
 (0.03) (0.383) (0.031) (0.735) (0.157) (0.312) (0.077) 
polity2  0.037***                        
  (0.000)                        
Civil_liberties   0.037*                       
   (0.083)                       
xconst    0.140***                      
    (0.000)                      
xropen     0.135***                     
     (0.000)                     
corruption      0.038                    
      (0.905)                    
checks       0.060*** 
       (0.005) 
_cons -0.747 -0.399 0.14 -0.811 -0.755 -1.589 -1.008 
 (0.201) (0.59) (0.867) (0.292) (0.323) (0.187) (0.101) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 879 842 805 794 794 595 830 
Countries 39 37 37 37 37 28 37 
R² 0.066 0.138 0.069 0.181 0.193 0.119 0.072 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
 
 (iii) Testing for public investment and total expenditure 
We now look at what happens for public investment and total expenditures. Heretofore, we 
have used government consumption spending as main variable to generate cyclicality 
coefficient. Even if Thornton (2008) argues that there is a strong case for leaving investment 
spending outside the constraints of fiscal policy, Fata´s (2005), Alesina and Tabellini (2005) 
shown that population’s demands (investment) force governments to pursue a pro-cyclical 
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fiscal stance in developing countries because of corruption. So, given the fact that for example 
a government may change either consumption or investment more in response to a change in 
output, we follow Erbil (2011) and Mpatswe, Tapsoba and York (2012) by interesting in 
public investment and government total expenditure. To this end, we generated the time-
varying cyclicality coefficient of equation (3) by using public investment and government 
total spending as dependent variables. Then, we estimated equation (5) for both the two 
variables.  
Results are reported in table A5 (in appendix) for public investment spending and table A6 for 
government total expenditures (see in appendix). We observe that beyond the fact that the 
associated coefficients to bilateral ODA cyclicality are significantly similar (highly 
significant) to those of government consumption, their magnitudes are greater.  However, in 
contrary to government consumption, we find that be financially opened is associated to less 
pro-cyclicality of public investment and government total expenditures.  
As for results of multilateral aid’s equation reported in table A7 and A8 (in appendix), we 
observe that pro-cyclical multilateral ODA affects positively the pro-cyclicality of public 
investment spending, while the effect on government total expenditures is mixed positive.  
Furthermore, the coefficients associated to aid cyclicality for public investment’s equation 
(table A7) are closely equal to those of government consumption’s equation (table 4). 
(iv)Testing for additional controls on baseline specification 
We add further controls in the baseline specification (i.e with government consumption 
spending as fiscal policy variable) in order to take into account other variables likely to affect 
pro-cyclicality of general government consumption expenditures. These additional controls 
are IMF programs “imf”, urbanization rate “urban”, the log of public investment 
“investment”, internal conflict “conflict”, the log of remittance inflows “remittance”, and total 
expenses over GDP (See in appendix for more details on data sources). Even controlling for 
these various variables, we found that bilateral ODA pro-cyclicality still affects negatively 
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government consumption spending cyclicality.  Furthermore, these estimations improve the 
goodness of the previous results.  
Table 7: Testing for additional controls on baseline specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Aidpro, t-1 -
0.032*** 
-0.034*** -
0.035*** 
-0.049*** -0.054*** -0.035**  -
0.034*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.019) (0.003) 
Log(gdppc) -0.168 -0.113 -0.078 -0.703** 0.660*** 0.115 -0.182 
 (0.412) (0.581) (0.715) (0.03) (0.004) (0.665) (0.374) 
debt 0.168** 0.180** 0.206*** 0.497*** 0.287*** 0.238**  0.168 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.021) 
private_credit -0.010** -0.010** -0.014** 0.021*** -0.024*** -0.015**  -0.01** 
 (0.042) (0.039) (0.015) (0.005) (0.000) (0.02) (0.045) 
kaopen 0.076* 0.065 0.086** 0.103** -0.054 -0.036 0.075* 
 (0.062) (0.105) (0.036) (0.029) (0.251) (0.477) (0.067) 
Inflation 0.374*** 0.368*** 0.377*** 0.382*** 0.590*** 0.455*** 0.371*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
polity2 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.0256*** 0.040*** 0.031*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) 
imf -0.047                      
 (0.506)                      
Log(urban)  -0.978***      
  (0.002)      
investment   -0.108     
   (0.169)     
conflict    -0.032    
    (0.194)    
remitance     3.122***   
     (0.001)   
expense      0.105  
      (0.622)  
aid       0.037 
       (0.489) 
_cons 0.17 2.869* -0.215 1.933 -6.092*** -2.588 0.061 
 (0.901) (0.072) (0.882) (0.364) (0.000) (0.179) (0.965) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 842 842 826 595 647 604 838 
Countries 37 37 37 29 31 32 37 
R² 0.245 0.2544 0.2508 0.3206 0.3167 0.2608 0.245 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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All these additional controls are checked for multilateral aid and the results are reported in 
table A9 (in appendix). We observe that even controlling for other determinants of fiscal 
policy behavior, pro-cyclical ODA from multilateral agencies still leads to more pro-cyclical 
government consumption spending.  
(v) Testing for alternative estimation method: instrumentation 
Finally, we investigate whether the estimates are robust to using alternative estimation 
methods. Heretofore, we have lagged ODA pro-cyclicality coefficients in order to avoid 
simultaneity issue and therefore endogeneity problem. If we drop this assumption, there are 
reasons to believe in endogeneity issue in our estimates. Indeed, governments can anticipate 
donor behaviors and then decide which policies they will rule. Furthermore, donor countries 
can make pressure on aid recipient countries-that is the so-called conditionality- and so dictate 
their fiscal policy behaviors. Then, causation may rule in two directions. As a consequence, 
the dropped lag of the above fixed effects estimations on the impact of ODA cyclicality on 
fiscal policy cyclicality may be biased. To account for the potential endogeneity of aid, we re-
estimate equation (5) by two-stage least squares (2SLS). Concretely, we propose to address 
the endogeneity issue by instrumenting ODA cyclicality coefficients with its lagged values, 
the average degree of independence of the donor’s development agencies “agency” and the 
average voting similarity index “proximity” at the United Nations General Assembly. The 
addition of external instruments weakens the potential “weak instruments” problem that often 
arises in using only lagged values.  
As for agency independence and proximity variable calculations, we replicate the formula 
written in section 3. Then, proximity (agency) is defined as political proximity (degree of 
agency’s independence) to the average weighted by the amount of aid a country receives from 
that particular donor. Political proximity is the voting similarity index that is equal to total of 
votes where both states agree over total of joint votes. The data are drawn from United 
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Nations General Assembly Voting Data (Strezhney and Voeten, 2013). Regarding the degree 
of donor’s agency independence, we used those constructed by Bertoli, Cornia and Manaresi 
(2008) and updated by Fuchs, Dreher and Nunnenkamp (2014). This variable takes one if the 
aid agency is independent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and zero otherwise.  
We now discuss on the relevance and exogeneity of these instruments. With respect to aid 
agency, Bertoli, Cornia and Manaresi (2008) argued that countries where aid is provided by 
an ‘independent aid agency’ may be less exposed to the whims of political-electoral cycles 
and thus exhibit higher and more stable aid to GDP ratios than countries where aid decisions 
are taken by the foreign affairs ministry or the prime minister’s office, i.e. institutions exposed 
to conflicting demands for funds (p. 14). Such assertion means that aid agency independence 
has an effect on aid donation but it is unbelievable that development agencies have a direct 
effect on recipients’ fiscal policy behavior apart from aid channel. We expect that recipient 
countries whose aid is from independent aid agencies less suffer of donor macroeconomic 
constraints.  As for political proximity, many studies found that aid tends to be low and less 
effective when political ideology differs between the donor and the recipient (Neumayer, 
2003; Dreher et al, 2013; Bobba and Powell, 2007; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Alesina and 
Dollar (2000) argue that the ―direction of foreign aid is dictated by political and strategic 
considerations, much more than by the economic needs and policy performance of the 
recipients. Therefore, we suspect political proximity to impact aid donation but not directly on 
recipients’ fiscal policy behavior. To conclude, our instruments appear relevant (i.e they are 
correlated with ODA cyclicality) and exogenous (i.e they are uncorrelated with recipients’ 
fiscal policy cyclicality). We will test the relevance and exogeneity of our instruments by 
using the Anderson’s test of under-identification, the Cragg-Donald’s test of weak 
identification and the Sargan test of overidentification. The results of the fixed effects 2SLS 
estimator are presented in table 8. See in appendix for those of first stage.  
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Table 8: Testing for alternative estimation method 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Aidpro -0.027*** -
0.030*** 
-
0.029*** 
-
0.045*** 
-
0.041*** 
-0.031** -0.026**  
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.014) 
Log(gdppc) -0.147 -0.205 -0.281 -0.259 -0.244 -0.813** -0.151 
 (0.295) (0.303) (0.191) (0.202) (0.221) (0.012) (0.296) 
debt 0.136** 0.134** 0.131** 0.153** 0.180*** 0.272*** 0.139**  
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.029) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) (0.017) 
private_credit -0.012*** -0.087* -0.010** -0.010** -
0.013*** 
0.018*** -
0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.065) (0.036) (0.037) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
kaopen 0.0539 0.0625 0.0548 0.0296 0.0542 0.104** 0.0544 
 (0.166) (0.117) (0.184) (0.461) (0.172) (0.024) (0.175) 
inflation 0.376*** 0.347*** 0.360*** 0.432*** 0.432*** 0.385*** 0.367*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
polity2  0.0152**                     
  (0.047)                     
Civil_liberties   -0.0442                    
   (0.211)                    
xconst    0.0315                   
    (0.216)                   
xropen     0.123***                  
     (0.000)                  
corruption      -0.22***                 
      (0.000)                 
checks       0.040 
       (0.238) 
Obs. 869 823 800 776 776 600 821 
Countries 39 37 37 37 37 28 37 
F(p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anderson (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CD (stat) 10000 9551.438 9079.354 7963.255 8023.696 7919.733 8952.291 
Sargan (p) 0.3153 0.1306 0.4424 0.1089 0.2078 0.3785 0.3811 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
 
As far as the quality of our instruments is concerned, we first look at their relevance and 
exogeneity. The Cragg-Donald statistics reject the null hypothesis of under-identification. 
Furthermore, the Anderson canonical correlation statistics reject the null hypothesis at the 1%, 
suggesting that the instruments are adequate to identify the equation. At last, the Sargan 
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overidentification tests do not reject the hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with 
the residuals of the models. Thus, our instruments are relevant and exogenous. 
On the whole, our results reported in table 8 are quite similar to those of table 3 concerning 
the signs associated to different variables. ODA cyclicality coefficients are strongly 
significant, and further negatively associated to government consumption spending 
cyclicality. However, the magnitude of the coefficients associated to ODA cyclicality are 
small than those of table 3 suggesting that fixed effect specifications are biased upwards.  
6-4. Channels of transmission 
In this section, we analyze the channels through which pro-cyclicality of aid could have 
stabilized pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries. To this end, we interact 
ODA cyclicality coefficients with other variables that are likely to influence fiscal policy and 
aid donation. These variables are: trade openness, colonization proxies by legal system, the 
HIPC initiative, the evolution of terms of trade, and primary or oil exporter dummies.  
First, we focus on commercial and political self-interest considerations. Indeed, these aspects 
can change the allocation of ODA and make it less dependent on donor macroeconomic 
conditions or lead to more influence on recipient countries. According to Bertoli, Cornia and 
Manaresi (2008), Colonial powers such as France, UK, Portugal and Spain have traditionally 
been important providers of aid to their former low income colonies (Round and Odedokun, 
2004). Furthermore, some authors tie aid allocation to trade interests. For instance, 
Berthélemy (2006) classifies major donors such as France, Japan and the United States to be 
egoistic donors as their aid allocation is influenced by trade-related interests. Moreover, 
Alesina and Dollar (2000: 33) provided evidence that “the direction of foreign aid is dictated 
as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the economic needs and policy 
performance of the recipients. On the one hand, for recipient countries, recent contributions to 
the literature have found that so-called aid-for-trade programs are effective in promoting 
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recipient countries’ exports (Fuchs, Dreher and Nunnenkamp, 2014; Calı` & te Velde, 2011). 
On the other hand, foreign aid could also be seen as a tool to promote trade for donor 
countries (Fuchs, Dreher and Nunnenkamp, 2014). Accordingly, Tingley (2010) suspects 
trade-dependent countries, with trade dependency measured by the sum of exports and 
imports relative to GDP, to be more “generous” donors. We control for all these 
considerations by including trade openness rate, legal system defined by dummies for French 
and British laws, and primary or oil exporter countries measured as a dummy that takes one if 
the country is primary or oil exporter and zero otherwise. Results are reported in table 9.  
We observe that the interactive coefficients with trade openness (column 1), French legal 
system (column 2), and primary or oil country dummy (column 6) are positive and significant. 
This means that these types of countries have been less favored by the stabilizing effect of 
pro-cyclicality of bilateral ODA. Given that trade opened SSA countries receive more aid 
(Alesina and Dollar, 2003; Fuchs, Dreher and Nunnenkamp, 2014; Calı` & te Velde, 2011), 
their policies are more likely to follow aid cyclicality. This expectation is the same for 
primary or oil exporter countries given that SSA countries export mainly in developed 
markets. Moreover, results show that the type of colonization or legal system matters. Indeed, 
we find that pro-cyclicality of ODA lead to more pro-cyclical fiscal policy for French legal 
system countries, contrary to other ones British. This finding can reflect what Bertoli, Cornia 
and Manaresi (2008) argued: “The type of colonization may also be an important factor, as 
former colonial powers such as the UK placed less importance on preserving a ‘special 
relation’ with their former subjects than, for instance, France which actively promotes the 
‘Francophonie’ through foreign aid” (p. 12). Then, the degree of closeness can be put forward 
to explain the difference of results between the two types of legal system.  
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Table 9: Testing for channels of transmission 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Aidpro, t-1 -0.239*** -0.090*** 0.013 -0.080*** -0.216*** -0.070*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.391) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
Aidpro*trade 0.045***                     
 (0.000)                     
Aidpro*french 0.104***     
  (0.000)     
Aidpro*british  -
0.101*** 
   
   (0.000)    
Aidpro*hipc    0.074***   
    (0.000)   
Aidpro*terms    0.044***  
     (0.001)  
Aidpro*prioil     0.047* 
      (0.074= 
trade -0.215                     
 (0.13)                     
Terms_trade     -0.159  
     (0.136)  
Log(gdppc) -0.043 -0.29 -0.311 -0.202 -0.196 -0.201 
 (0.831) (0.151) (0.127) (0.318) (0.357) (0.324) 
debt 0.193*** 0.242*** 0.245*** 0.211*** 0.166** 0.148**  
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.025) (0.044) 
private_credit -0.013*** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.095* -0.011**  
 (0.008) (0.032) (0.031) (0.027) (0.059) (0.03) 
kaopen 0.080** 0.066* 0.058 0.055 0.046 0.058 
 (0.043) (0.099) (0.145) (0.172) (0.271) (0.162) 
inflation 0.431*** 0.346*** 0.353*** 0.367*** 0.412*** 0.381*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
polity2 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
_cons 0.076 0.69 0.782 0.295 0.86 0.421 
 (0.957) (0.608) (0.563) (0.827) (0.539) (0.758) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 836 842 842 842 822 842 
Countries 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R² 0.285 0.270 0.266 0.259 0.271 0.248 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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Then, we now look at the role of terms of trade. They are widely investigated in previous 
literature related to fiscal policy (Mpatswe, Tapsoba and York, 2012; Erbil 2011; Diallo, 
2009; Woo, 2008; Halland and Bleaney, 2011; and so on). Woo( 2008) argued that the 
improvement in the terms of trade may relax fiscal budget constraints through rising revenue 
or improved access to international capital markets, and vice versa (for example, consider a 
commodity boom and bust). Moreover, through the STABEX
6  
pact signed in 1975 by the 
European Union and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, aid allocation was 
related to the evolution of terms of trade. It gives the possibility of European countries 
offering financial compensation to ACP countries in order to help improve the stability of 
export earnings. This pact was abolished in 2000 during the signing of the Cotonou 
agreements but Brun et al (1999) found that the STABEX has contributed to relax financial 
constraint and allowed additional expenses. Results reported in table 9 (column 5) shed light 
that the interactive variable with terms of trade is positive and significant at 1 % level. In 
other words, pro-cyclicality of ODA leads to more pro-cyclical government consumption 
spending for countries where terms of trade have increased. This can be due to shocks faced 
by exporter countries that are more dependent to world outlook and therefore follow 
international financial conditions.  
At last, through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative launched in 1996, 
many SSA countries have benefited from debt relief that is reported as aid allocation. This 
initiative allowed some donor countries to substitute debt cancellation to aid allocation in 
order to face severe macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, this initiative has contributed to 
increase government spending in SSA countries. To investigate its role, we interact ODA 
cyclicality coefficient with a dummy variable that takes one if the year is post 1996 and zero 
otherwise. Results presented in column (4) highlight that during the post 1996 period, the pro-
cyclicality of ODA has amplified the pro-cyclicality of government consumption spending. 
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We can explain this finding by the fact that debt cancellation is preceded by an assessment of 
the economic governance effectiveness that links aid allocation to recipients’ economic 
performance and therefore a pro-cyclicality behavior between the two variables.  
As for ODA from multilateral agencies (see table A10 in appendix), results highlight that the 
opening up to international trade and the HIPC initiative exacerbate the effect of the pro-
cyclicality of multilateral aid on government consumption spending, while the status of 
primary or oil exporter and the stance of terms of trade do not matter. Given that developed 
countries can be key influencers on multilateral agencies, it is not surprising that both bilateral 
and multilateral aid have the same effect on fiscal policy behavior when it comes to the case 
of trade opened countries. Furthermore, we observe that the effect of multilateral aid differ 
widely between French and British legal system’s countries. Contrary to bilateral aid, pro-
cyclical ODA from multilateral agencies leads to more pro-cyclical government consumption 
spending in British legal system’s countries, while it dampens pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy 
in French legal system’s countries. This finding means that ODA approach differs between 
the two types of legal system, what is very surprising.  
7. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
Most empirical research on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy conducted during the last decades 
has argued that pro-cyclical access to international capital markets by developing countries 
may lead to pro-cyclical fiscal policies. Pro-cyclicality in financing for low-income countries 
may constrain their ability to run counter-cyclical fiscal policies. As for ODA, lack of policy 
space due to conditions attached to lending by international financial community limits the set 
of policy choices available to countries in response to shocks. In this paper, we empirically 
tested the hypothesis according to which ODA pro-cyclicality can lead to fiscal policy pro-
cyclicality in SSA countries because of their high reliance on aid as source of financing. To 
this end, we employed panel data techniques covering 39 SSA countries over the period from 
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1985 to 2012. Contrary to our expectations, the results provide strong empirical evidence that 
bilateral ODA pro-cyclicality is negatively associated to fiscal policy pro-cyclicality, while 
pro-cyclical multilateral ODA exacerbates fiscal policy behavior. This finding is robust to 
potential error bias in ODA cyclicality coefficients, alternative specifications, additional 
controls and different estimation methods. Furthermore, the effects seem to differ between 
British legal system‘s countries where bilateral aid leads to counter-cyclical fiscal policy and 
other ones French where ODA from multilateral agencies appears more better for fiscal 
policy. However, both bilateral and multilateral ODA pro-cyclicality can lead to more pro-
cyclical fiscal policy when the country is opened to international trade, oil or primary 
products exporter. We also found that the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative and an 
improvement of the terms of trade stance lead to more pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Moreover, 
our investigation on the other determinants of pro-cyclicality has shown that domestic 
financial depth and high GDP per capita decrease pro-cyclicality of government consumption 
spending. However, better governance and institutions, a loss of stabilization tool and 
macroeconomic policy unsustainability conduct to more fiscal policy pro-cyclicality in SSA 
countries.  
Our findings suggest that despite its magnitude in SSA countries’ budgets, bilateral ODA 
does not play the leading determinant of the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in these countries. 
There are two main reasons why bilateral aid has not played a significant role in pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy in Africa. First, current aid allocation mechanisms rely on identifying a financing 
gap and then seeing how aid could close this gap. Thus, given the fact that African countries 
are in most of times in budget deficit, this approach of ODA makes it less harmful to fiscal 
policy stance. Contrary to the case of bilateral aid, ODA from multilateral agencies like the 
IMF is most of times used to boost budget deficit. Second, as a result of emphasis on the 
MDGs, there has been a shift in aid allocation from economic infrastructure and production to 
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the social sectors. Not only the needs for social sectors are all times enormous, but also they 
are mainly funded through bilateral ODA. So, even if aid allocation depends on donor 
macroeconomic conditions, the latter remain attached to the recipients’ social sectors 
improvement whose projects are controlled by them.  
In a nutshell, the effect of ODA on fiscal policy behavior depends on the types of aid. 
However, according to our results, SSA countries have to fight against debt and inflation in 
order to improve their policy space that is necessary to run counter-cyclical fiscal policy. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that current institutions are harmful to fiscal policy. So, there 
is need for enhanced political commitment in designing and implementing national strategies 
for improving the respect for laws. Given the fact our findings show that pro-cyclicality of 
fiscal policy exists but is decreasing in SSA countries, the latter should pursue financial sector 
and tax administration reforms, provide sufficient incentives for tax collectors and develop 
local capacity in order to stable domestic resources that are important to run counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy.  
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1-Also, their findings do not corroborate to hypothesis of bad governance or political distortions put 
forward to explain pro-cyclicality in developing countries. See Tornell and Lane, Talvi and Végh 
(2005), Alesina and Tabellini, 2005. 
2-They use the local Gaussian-weighted OLS to generate time-varying cyclical coefficients. These 
estimates confirm pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in CEMAC countries. Furthermore, the results show 
that aid is positively associated to pro-cyclicality of total expenditures. 
3-According to Netherlands’ Embassy in Burkina Faso, 17 other countries will be concerned with this 
measure. Netherlands’ government aims to reduce the number of development agency representation 
from 33 to 15, and aid from 0.8 % over GDP to 0.7 %. See 
<http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article45968> 
4- Canada, France, Japan, United Kingdom, Russia, United States of America, Italia, and Germany 
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5- See Ben Slimane et BEN TAHAR (2010); Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004);  Alesina and 
Tabellini (2005);  Calderon and Schmit-hebbel (2008); Endegnanew (2013); Thornton (2008); Lane 
(1998, 2003b);  Woo (2005); Halland and Bleaney (2011); Aghion and Marinescu (2008) and 
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6- Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation. These agreements were signed by 23th June 
2000 in Benin and regroup 27 European Union countries and 79 ACP countries. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Sample 
Sample 
Angola Guinea Niger 
Burundi Gambia Nigeria 
Benin Guinea-Bissau Rwanda 
Burkina Faso Equatorial 
Guinea 
Senegal 
Botswana Kenya Sierra Leone 
Central African 
Republic 
Liberia Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Cote d'Ivoire Leshoto Swaziland 
Cameroon Madagascar Chad 
Congo Mali Togo 
Cape Verde Mozambique Tanzania 
Ethiopia Mauritius Uganda 
Gabon Malawi Zambia 
Ghana Namibia Zimbabwe 
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Table A2: Definition of variables and sources  
Variable Definition Source 
IMF IMF programs IMF's website 
GDPPC Gross Domestic Product per Capita World Development Indicators-the World Bank 
debt Domestic debt, in percentage of GDP Historical Public Debt Database of IMF-Abbas et al (2010) 
Private_Credit Domestic Credit to private sector, in percentage of GDP World Development Indicators-the World Bank 
F Real general government consumption growth, Real public 
investment growth and real government total expenditures. 
2005 is the base year 
United Nations data-
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/introduction.asp> 
Y Real gross domestic product growth, with 2005 as base year United Nations data-
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/introduction.asp> 
ODA Real Official Development Assistance growth, with 2012 as 
the base year 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development-Query Wizard for International Development 
Statistics (QWIDS) datasets 
Inflation Consumer price index World Development Indicators-the World Bank 
Kaopen Financial openness Index. It measures a country's degree of 
capital account openness 
Chinn-Ito dataset (Menzie and Ito, 2006) 
Polity2 Degree of democracy. Difference between a democracy 
index (0 to 10) and an autocracy index (0 to 10) 
Polity 4 database 
Xconst Constraints on the executive. The extent of institutionalized 
constraints on the decision-making power of chief 
executives, whether individuals or collectivities. It ranges 
from 1 to 7. A high value indicates greater executive 
constraints.  
Polity 4 database 
Xropen Government openness. The extent of government openness 
to population from discussions and decisions. It ranges from  
1 to 7 with high values representing high openness. 
Polity 4 database 
Civil_liberties Civil liberties Freedom House (2013) 
Corruption This is an assessment of corruption within the political 
system. 
International Country Risk Guide-2013 
Checks Checks and balance. Extent of formal political control on 
political decision makers 
World Bank's Database of Political Institutions 
Terms_trade Terms of trade of goods and services World Bank's Database of Political Institutions 
Y_Donor Real gross domestic product, with 2005 as base year United Nations data-
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<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/introduction.asp> 
Urban urbanisation rate World Development Indicators-the World Bank 
Investment Public investment in percentage of GDP  
Conflict This is an assessment of political violence in the country. 
The highest rating is given to those countries where there is 
no armed or civil opposition to the government and the 
government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or 
indirect, against its own people. The lowest rating is given 
to a country embroiled in an on-going civil war. 
International Country Risk Guide-2013 
Remittance Remittance inflows Migration and Remittances data-the World Bank 
Expense Government total expenditures, in percentage of GDP  
Agency This variable takes one if the aid agency is independent 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and zero otherwise. It 
is weighted by  the amount of aid a country receives from 
that particular donor 
Fuchs, Dreher and Nunnenkamp (2014) 
Political_proximity Political proximity is the voting similarity index that is 
equal to total of votes where both states agree over total of 
joint votes. It is weighted by the amount of aid a country 
receives from that particular donor. 
United Nations General Assembly Voting Data (Strezhney 
and Voeten, 2013)  
trade Exports of goods and services plus imports of goods and 
services, in percentage of GDP 
World Development Indicators-the World Bank (2014) 
French Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the country uses 
French's legal system and zero otherwise 
The World Bank 
British Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the country uses 
British's legal system and zero otherwise 
The World Bank 
prioil Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the country is oil or 
primary products exporter and zero otherwise 
The World Bank 
aidpro Time-varying cyclicality coefficients of ODA obtained from authors'calculation using Gaussian-Weighted OLS 
hipc Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if year after the 
implement of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative, and zero otherwise  
Strategy, Policy and Review department database, IMF 
 Etudes et Documents n° 24, CERDI, 2014 
 
56 
   
Table A3: Matrix of correlation 
 fiscalpro  aidpro lgdppc ldebtgdp private_credit kaopen inflation polity2 cl xconst xropen corruption checks 
fiscalpro 1             
aidpro -0.05 1            
Log(gdppc) -0.01 -0.22 1           
debt 0.01 -0.11 -0.33 1          
private_credit -0.01 0.18 0.18 -0.32 1         
kaopen 0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.1 0.03 1        
inflation 0.3 -0.19 0.14 -0.21 0.14 0.18 1       
polity2 0.16 -0.07 -0.02 -0.22 -0.06 0.12 0.31 1      
cl -0.14 0.11 -0.17 0.3 0.03 -0.16 -0.23 -0.76 1     
xconst 0.15 -0.09 0.02 -0.26 0.01 0.17 0.24 0.93 -0.7 1    
xropen 0.25 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.24 -0.05 -0.03 0.43 -0.18 0.54 1   
corruption -0.13 0.09 -0.07 0.04 -0.06 0.15 -0.11 0.03 -0.03 0.1 0.15 1  
checks 0.23 -0.17 0.05 -0.13 -0.04 0.21 0.33 0.63 -0.48 0.57 0.26 -0.11 1 
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Table A4: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
fiscalpro 1092 0.698 1.387 -7.612 5.461 
aidpro 1092 0.1374 3.535 -18.134 17.694 
Log(gdppc) 1072 6.429 1.016 3.912 9.609 
ldebtgdp 969 4.172 0.820 -0.425 6.260 
private_credit 1015 16.000 12.898 0.815 103.632 
kaopen 1030 -0.695 1.078 -1.863 2.439 
inflation 1047 4.112 1.286 -5.521 6.621 
polity2 1012 -0.193 5.918 -10 10 
cl 962 4.380 1.387 1 7 
xconst 951 3.535 1.903 1 7 
xropen 951 2.666 1.855 0 4 
corruption 721 2.481 0.963 0 5 
checks 1014 2.114 1.112 1 6 
trade 1042 73.082 37.481 10.830 275.234 
french 1092 0.615 0.486 0 1 
british 1092 0.384 0.486 0 1 
prioil 1092 0.692 0.461 0 1 
agency 1092 0.568 0.144 0.2 0.9 
agree2un 1049 0.687 0.065 0.282 1 
lterms 1015 4.670 0.358 3.057 5.754 
imf 1092 0.588 0.492 0 1 
Log(urban) 1092 3.391 0.527 1.620 4.459 
Log(investment) 1019 2.943 0.545 0.316 5.042 
conflict 721 7.852 2.268 0.166 12 
lexpense 781 3.181 0.340 2.187 4.277 
remitance 777 0.038 0.081 0 0.539 
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Table A5: Testing for public investment expenditures 
 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Aidpro, t-1 -
0.062*** 
-0.062*** -
0.069*** 
-0.041** -0.033* -0.027 -0.057*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.071) (0.107) (0.000) 
Log(gdppc) 0.269 0.408 0.077 0.518* 0.49 -0.311 0.112 
 (0.166) (0.166) (0.801) (0.096) (0.116) (0.43) (0.571) 
debtgdp 0.059 0.109 -0.039 0.097 0.103 0.088 -0.037 
 (0.540) (0.296) (0.714) (0.371) (0.344) (0.479) (0.707) 
private_credit -
0.030*** 
-0.033*** -
0.028*** 
-
0.033*** 
-
0.036*** 
-
0.038*** 
-0.027*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
kaopen -0.508 -0.443*** -
0.475*** 
-
0.437*** 
-
0.440*** 
-
0.514*** 
-0.488*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
inflation -0.012 -0.067 -0.024 -0.134** -0.090 0.077 -0.021 
 (0.827) (0.223) (0.665) (0.041) (0.161) (0.135) (0.695) 
polity2  0.077***                     
  (0.000)                     
Civil_liberties   0.166***                    
   (0.002)                    
xconst    0.220***                   
    (0.000)                   
xropen     0.184***                  
     (0.000)                  
corruption      -
0.345*** 
                
      (0.000)                 
checks       0.106**  
       (0.038) 
_cons 0.602 0.281 3.292 -1.081 -1.004 5.180* 1.712 
 (0.689) (0.886) (0.123) (0.603) (0.63) (0.051) (0.267) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 889 837 816 789 789 605 840 
Countries 39 37 37 37 37 28 37 
R² 0.2034 0.2456 0.2106 0.2383 0.2319 0.3044 0.2046 
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Table A6: Testing for government total expenditures 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Aidpro, t-1 -0.355*** -
0.036*** 
-
0.042*** 
-
0.035*** 
-0.027** -0.025** -0.032*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.029) (0.044) (0.004) 
Log(gdppc) 0.011 -0.113 -0.356* -0.041 -0.064 -1.159*** -0.056 
 (0.935) (0.57) (0.09) (0.845) (0.761) (0.000) (0.68) 
debt 0.151** 0.214*** 0.132* 0.226*** 0.238*** 0.221** 0.111 
 (0.022) (0.003) (0.07) (0.002) (0.001) (0.017) (0.108) 
private_credit -0.023*** -
0.022*** 
-
0.020*** 
-
0.023*** 
-
0.026*** 
-0.014** -0.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) 
kaopen -0.219*** -
0.166*** 
-
0.190*** 
-
0.187*** 
-
0.181*** 
-0.185*** -0.203*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
inflation 0.226*** 0.181*** 0.211*** 0.235*** 0.261*** 0.306*** 0.216*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
polity2  0.063***                     
  (0.000)                     
Civil_liberties   0.146***                    
   (0.000)                    
xconst    0.165***                   
    (0.000)                   
xropen     0.170***                  
     (0.000)                  
corruption      -0.270***                 
      (0.000)                 
checks       0.106*** 
       (0.002) 
_cons 0.346 1.402 3.606** 0.085 0.086 8.089*** 0.72 
 (0.735) (0.291) (0.014) (0.952) (0.952) (0.000) (0.497) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 889 837 816 789 789 605 840 
Countries 39 37 37 37 37 28 37 
R² 0.129 0.191 0.143 0.181 0.191 0.218 0.138 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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Table A7: Bootstrap results for multilateral aid equation 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Aidprom, t-1 0.02*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(gdppc) -0.208* -0.141 -0.263 -0.0812 -0.105 -0.746** -0.206*   
 (0.078) (0.441) (0.21) (0.703) (0.634) (0.022) (0.089) 
debtgdp 0.193*** 0.203** 0.193** 0.226*** 0.246*** 0.417*** 0.193*** 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.014) (0.007) (0.002) (0.000) (0.006) 
private_credit -
0.019*** 
-
0.018*** 
-
0.019*** 
-
0.019*** 
-
0.022*** 
-0.073 -0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.929) (0.000) 
kaopen 0.052 0.076* 0.055 0.044 0.062 0.079* 0.059 
 (0.164) (0.072) (0.175) (0.242) (0.146) (0.071) (0.133) 
Inflation 0.340*** 0.294*** 0.324*** 0.420*** 0.420*** 0.354*** 0.325*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
polity2  0.032***                     
  (0.000)                     
Civil_liberties   -0.054                    
   (0.133)                    
xconst    0.093***                   
    (0.000)                   
xropen     0.152***                  
     (0.000)                  
corruption      -
0.224*** 
                
      (0.000)                 
checks       0.0861**  
       (0.021) 
_cons 0.121 -0.0464 0.808 -1.241 -1.272 2.886 0.0236 
 (0.909) (0.972) (0.615) (0.421) (0.422) (0.23) (0.983) 
Year_dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 880 828 806 784 784 598 831 
countries 39 37 37 37 37 28 37 
R² 0.252 0.281 0.246 0.3211 0.3476 0.331 0.261 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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Table A8: Testing for alternative measure of business cycle for multilateral aid’s equation 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Aidprom, t-1 0.071*** 0.068*** 0.022*** 0.075*** 0.088*** 0.095*** 0.090*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(gdppc) 0.065 0.102 -0.178 0.118 0.091 0.166 0.075 
 (0.405) (0.379) (0.433) (0.328) (0.445) (0.396) (0.354) 
debtgdp 0.035 0.068* 0.205*** 0.064 0.074* 0.031 0.046 
 (0.357) (0.093) (0.008) (0.119) (0.068) (0.587) (0.263) 
private_credit 0.062 -0.048 -
0.022*** 
-0.015 -0.043 0.047 -0.015 
 (0.982) (0.875) (0.000) (0.626) (0.172) (0.365) (0.604) 
kaopen 0.017 0.029 0.045 0.027 0.029 -0.076 0.067 
 (0.938) (0.189) (0.293) (0.23) (0.187) (0.772) (0.772) 
inflation 0.026 -0.031 0.328*** -0.016 0.075 -0.030 0.011 
 (0.25) (0.891) (0.000) (0.551) (0.977) (0.905) (0.622) 
polity2  0.039***                        
  (0.000)                        
Civil_liberties   -0.024                       
   (0.556)                       
xconst    0.144***                      
    (0.000)                      
xropen     0.143***                     
     (0.000)                     
corruption      -0.051                    
      (0.124)                    
checks       0.066*** 
       (0.002) 
_cons -0.432 -0.421 -0.017 -0.968 -0.897 -0.96 -0.553 
 (0.475) (0.586) (0.991) (0.229) (0.26) (0.466) (0.384) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 835 799 777 755 755 563 787 
Countries 39 37 37 37 37 28 37 
R² 0.058 0.143 0.238 0.187 0.204 0.106 0.078 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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Test A9: Testing for public investment expenditures for multilateral aid’s equation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Aidprom, t-1 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(gdppc) 0.387* -0.062 -0.178 0.058 -0.012 -0.785** -0.184 
 (0.052) (0.771) (0.433) (0.979) (0.957) (0.026) (0.207) 
debt 0.061 0.218*** 0.205*** 0.240*** 0.261*** 0.409*** 0.213*** 
 (0.537) (0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
private_credit -
0.035*** 
-
0.022*** 
-
0.022*** 
-
0.023*** 
-
0.026*** 
0.0951 -0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.916) (0.000) 
kaopen -
0.484*** 
0.071* 0.045 0.043 0.060 0.074 0.056 
 (0.000) (0.085) (0.293) (0.294) (0.139) (0.124) (0.176) 
inflation 0.099 0.301*** 0.328*** 0.451*** 0.445*** 0.356*** 0.333*** 
 (0.863) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
polity2  0.029***                     
  (0.001)                     
Civil_liberties   -0.024                    
   (0.556)                    
xconst    0.084***                   
    (0.001)                   
xropen     0.149***                  
     (0.000)                  
corruption      -
0.247*** 
                
      (0.000)                 
checks       0.084**  
       (0.021) 
_cons -0.059 -0.69 -0.017 -2.004 -2.086 3.035 -0.264 
 (0.97) (0.628) (0.991) (0.176) (0.151) (0.2) (0.817) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 846 799 777 755 755 578 802 
Countries 39 37 37 37 37 28 27 
R² 0.2055 0.276 0.238 0.32 0.3465 0.324 0.2558 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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Table A10: Testing for government total expenditures for multilateral aid’s equation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Aidprom, t-1 0.043 0.039 0.064* 0.052 0.067* 0.044 0.084**  
 (0.182) (0.23) (0.063) (0.152) (0.061) (0.192) (0.013) 
Log(gdppc) 0.034 0.051 -0.176 0.146 0.119 -
1.023*** 
-0.061 
 (0.803) (0.808) (0.422) (0.515) (0.593) (0.001) (0.662) 
debtgdp 0.186*** 0.244*** 0.160** 0.254*** 0.270*** 0.230** 0.146**  
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.032) (0.001) (0.000) (0.013) (0.039) 
private_credit -
0.031*** 
-
0.032*** 
-
0.031*** 
-
0.034*** 
-
0.038*** 
-
0.031*** 
-0.031*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
kaopen -
0.202*** 
-
0.156*** 
-
0.183*** 
-
0.173*** 
-
0.166*** 
-
0.185*** 
-0.191*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
inflation 0.199*** 0.159*** 0.173*** 0.213*** 0.224*** 0.276*** 0.177*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
polity2  0.056***                     
  (0.000)                     
Civil_liberties   -
0.113*** 
                   
   (0.004)                    
xconst    0.145***                   
    (0.000)                   
xropen     0.166***                  
     (0.000)                  
corruption      -
0.292*** 
                
      (0.000)                 
checks       0.0924*** 
       (0.008) 
_cons 0.139 0.311 2.302 -1.099 -1.067 7.458*** 0.751 
 (0.895) (0.824) (0.129) (0.463) (0.471) (0.000) (0.493) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 846 795 774 751 751 574 798 
Countries 39 37 37 36 36 28 37 
R² 0.129 0.182 0.138 0.176 0.195 0.232 0.139 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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Table A11: Testing for additional controls on baseline specification for multilateral aid’s 
equation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Aidprom, t-1 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(gdppc) -0.049 0.098 -0.010 -0.442 0.630*** 0.151 
 (0.817) (0.963) (0.962) (0.198) (0.009) (0.582) 
debtgdp 0.219*** 0.234*** 0.246*** 0.533*** 0.313*** 0.295*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
private_credit -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.024*** 0.007 -0.033*** -0.023*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.445) (0.000) (0.001) 
kaopen 0.072* 0.055 0.079* 0.041 -0.002 -0.0184 
 (0.08) (0.175) (0.057) (0.401) (0.959) (0.723) 
inflation 0.305*** 0.288*** 0.301*** 0.300*** 0.506*** 0.416*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
polity2 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.019* 0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.05) (0.001) 
imf -0.137*                     
 (0.05)                     
lurban  -1.302***     
  (0.000)     
linvestment   -0.112    
   (0.156)    
conflict    -0.068***   
    (0.005)   
remitance     4.659***  
     (0.000)  
lexpense      0.072 
      (0.739) 
_cons -0.7 2.987* -0.787 0.242 -5.972*** -2.881 
 (0.622) (0.075) (0.594) (0.915) (0.000) (0.151) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 799 799 785 563 617 574 
Countries 37 37 35 28 36 36 
R² 0.28 0.292 0.28 0.352 0.318 0.28 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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Table A12: Testing for channels of transmission for multilateral aid’s equation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Aidprom, t-1 -0.014 0.014** 0.085 -0.038 -0.034 0.018 
 (0.493) (0.028) (0.982) (0.329) (0.86) (0.709) 
aidprom*trade 0.087*                     
 (0.075)                     
aidprom*french -0.013*     
  (0.076)     
aidprom*british  0.019**    
   (0.011)    
aidprom*hipc   0.025***   
    (0.000)   
aidprom*terms    0.020  
     (0.62)  
aidprom_prioil     0.043 
      (0.476) 
trade -0.063                     
 (0.966)                     
Terms_trade     -0.068  
     (0.522)  
Log(gdppc) 0.064 0.155 0.181 0.063 0.051 0.116 
 (0.766) (0.468) (0.396) (0.763) (0.819) (0.588) 
debt 0.231*** 0.285*** 0.294*** 0.242*** 0.245*** 0.258*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
private_credit -0.025*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
kaopen 0.085** -0.156*** -0.149*** -0.143*** -0.173*** -0.156*** 
 (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
inflation 0.374*** 0.158*** 0.153*** 0.178*** 0.172*** 0.157*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
polity2 0.027*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
_cons -1.698 -0.501 -0.676 0.217 0.595 -0.136 
 (0.257) (0.727) (0.635) (0.877) (0.681) (0.924) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 787 789 789 789 775 789 
Countries 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R² 0.3 0.186 0.19 0.199 0.195 0.183 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
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Table A13: Results for first stage of the 2SLS for bilateral aid equation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
agency 1.018*** 1.344*** 1.252*** 1.038*** 0.943*** 1.614*** 1.152*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
proximity -0.638*** -0.585** -0.634** -0.77*** -0.80*** -0.82** -0.613** 
 (0.007) (0.026) (0.017) (0.005) (0.003) (0.016) (0.014) 
Log(gdppc) -0.171** -0.132 -0.07 -0.021 -0.027 -0.401** -0.219** 
 (0.036) (0.238) (0.56) (0.858) (0.815) (0.014) (0.01) 
debt -0.025 -0.017 -0.046 -0.044 -0.045 0.017 -0.037 
 (0.42) (0.595) (0.894) (0.201) (0.189) (0.69) (0.266) 
private_credit 0.034 0.073 0.016 -0.011 -0.066 0.019*** 0.036 
 (0.137) (0.783) (0.538) (0.681) (0.81) (0.000) (0.134) 
kaopen -0.062*** -0.076*** -
0.068*** 
-0.053** -0.048** 0.075 -
0.066*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.019) (0.034) (0.745) (0.004) 
inflation 0.048*** 0.082*** 0.06*** 0.046** 0.028 0.083 0.056*** 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.003) (0.039) (0.179) (0.658) (0.004) 
Polity2  -0.023***      
  (0.000)      
Civil_liberties   0.066***     
   (0.001)     
xconst    -0.035**    
    (0.018)    
xropen     -0.01   
     (0.466)   
Corruption      -0.037  
      (0.186)  
Checks       -0.034* 
       (0.081) 
Obs. 869 823 800 776 776 600 821 
Countries 39 37 37 37 37 28 37 
F(p) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Anderson (p) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CD (stat) 10000 9551.438 9079.354 7963.255 8023.696 7919.733 8952.291 
Sargan (p) 0.3153 0.1306 0.4424 0.1089 0.2078 0.3785 0.3811 
The table reports regression coefficients and in parenthesis the associated p-value 
***p<0.01, significant at 1% ; **p<0.05, significant at 5%; *p<0.10, significant at 10% 
 
 
 
 
